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One of the most striking ideas that Edward J. McCaffery suggests
in Taxing Women' is that equality, of the right sort, must be thought of
in gendered terms. We must relinquish the idea that we can find or
declare some neutral principle that will achieve the goal of equality,
particularly with respect to the relationship between work and family,
because the social context makes it impossible. Rather, we need to
devise gender-specific strategies to achieve equality, even if they are
couched in gender-neutral language. In my recent work examining
single parent families, I have come to much the same conclusion:
meaningful support for single parents, albeit extremely unlikely in the
present political climate, requires separate consideration of the needs
of single mothers and single fathers. The dominant patterns of work
and family for single mothers and fathers are remarkably distinct;
thus, their greatest needs are quite different. Single mothers most
need economic support for nurturing, while single fathers most need
cultural support for a reconstructed notion of fatherhood. McCaffery
similarly argues that in order to achieve work-family equality, married
women need to have their wage work taxed less, while married men
need to have their wage work taxed more?
* Professor, University of Florida College of Law. B.A. 1971, University of Connecticut;
M.A. 1973, University of Illinois; J.D. 1981, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. I am
grateful for the research assistance of Alicia Lopez in completing this essay.
1. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WomaN (1997) [hereinafter TAXING WOMEN]; see
also Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 289 (1996) (argu-
ing that achieving equality means looking at the terms and conditions on which critical social
structures of work and family are built).
2. NANcY E. DOWD, IN DEFENsE OF SINGLE PARENT FAmums (1997).
3. TAXING WOMEN, supra note 1, at 200.
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Deciding that gender-specific solutions are needed may, never-
theless, raise other questions. First, determining what those solutions
or policies should be and whether they should be couched and/or justi-
fied in gender-neutral or gender-specific terms, is by no means an easy
decision to make. While gender neutrality seems to be our preferred
norm, it may only reinforce a false sense of objectivity, or contribute
to a jaded view of professedly "fair" reforms. Second, identifying
solutions may raise the risk of essentialism when the goal of legal
reform is to permit or encourage particular gender roles. For exam-
ple, by making it easier for women to do wage work, we may be con-
veying the message that wage work is the preferred gender role for
women. Conversely, by making it more difficult for men to only do
wage work, we may be similarly suggesting a preferred gender role for
men that incorporates nurturing children. Third, the very separation
of "male" and "female" roles can reinforce stereotypical notions of
difference, as well as limit our sense of what an alternative, egalitarian
vision would be. An overly simplistic dualistic approach can reconsti-
tute the very gender limits that we decry. Fourth, failing to take
account of race, ethnic and class differences perpetuates other kinds
of inequalities, including a persistent pattern of attention to middle-
class needs to the exclusion of low-income needs. Finally, the focus on
adult, gender-specific needs may reinforce the trend of leaving chil-
dren out of the discussion of the very restructuring that is purportedly
for their benefit.
This essay discusses some of the equality issues generated by
McCaffery's revolutionary yet modest gender-specific proposal for tax
reform. In addition to considering some potential consequences for
women and men, I also briefly consider the perspective of children.
McCaffery lays bare gender bias in tax and tax-related structures
centering around support for traditional single-income, male-bread-
winner marital families. He traces the core of this bias to tax rules
constructed in the 1930s and '40s, which disproportionately disadvan-
tage secondary wage earners by tying their income to primary earners
and taxing their income at a higher rate. Since most secondary wage
earners are women, this has the consequence of disproportionately
taxing women for performing wage work. The beneficiaries of tax
reform for secondary wage earners would be primarily working wives
and mothers, with varying effects by income. McCaffery argues that
the strong negative effects of current tax policies are especially severe
at the low and high income levels, in addition to strongly discouraging
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middle income women.' At the lowest income levels, significant bene-
fits may be lost by leaving welfare for wage work; at the highest
income levels, tax rates are the highest when the economic incentive
for a second income is the lowest.'
McCaffery proposes a gender-specific restructuring of our tax
policies and suggests, among other things, that we use optimal tax the-
ory to reform the system. Simply put, he would tax women less and
tax men more.6 His proposal rests on certain core gender generaliza-
tions as well as his analysis of how the existing tax structure works.
McCaffery points out that women have significantly changed their
work-family roles,7 while men have not.' Women do more wage work
but men generally do not do more family work.9 Althoiigh women's
wage work patterns look more and more like traditional male wage
work patterns,10 women's feelings about and commitment to wage
work are quite dissimilar to men's." McCaffery characterizes women
as generally more ambivalent and unhappy with full-time wage work
than men. Although married women with children do not want to
stay home, working full-time leaves them conflicted and unhappy.'
Taxing women more heavily thus adds to an existing range of reasons
not to engage in wage work. 3 Women have high tax elasticity, mean-
ing that they are quite responsive to changes in tax burdens. Taxing
them less would result in less negative consequences for women who
do wage work, and would therefore presumably encourage more
women to engage in wage work. At a minimum, women could make
their choices more freely. Most notably, they could decide whether or
not to do wage work without the disincentive of a high tax burden
pushing against wage work.
McCaffery views men, on the other hand, as implacably tied to
their work and largely unresponsive to women's shifts in work and
family responsibilities.' 4 The current tax system reinforces those
4. TAxING WoiMN, supra note 1, at 185-201.
5. 1& at 194.
6. See id. at 185-201.
7. Ma at 192-3.
8. Id. at 197.
9. See id. at 201.
10. See id. at 199.
11. See id. at 190.
12. See id. at 191.
13. See id. at 200.
14. Id. at 193.
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trends. Men are pushed by their wives' tax burden and by the com-
parative ease of increasing their income versus adding another earner,
toward greater commitment to full-time wage work.15 Men have
strong tax inelasticity: they are largely unresponsive to tax changes;
they simply keep on working.' 6 Men, he argues, would withstand a
significantly higher tax burden before their behavior would change. 17
If changing their behavior is desirable, then a higher tax burden is
justified as a means to reallocate family responsibilities. The justifica-
tion for changing their behavior is equality.' 8
Equality, in McCaffery's view, means not merely fitting women
into male-defined, male-constructed structures of work, but rather
means transforming work structures to achieve "diverse, creative,
dynamic, and flexible work-family arrangements."' 9 McCaffery's goal
is to contribute to that end. I do not read his proposal as claiming to
get us there, but rather as a step along the way. His gendered propo-
sal intrigues me as an opportunity to think through the implications of
gendered solutions to gender inequalities. In the sections that follow I
consider the implications of his optimal tax proposal for women and
men, as well as the question of how to incorporate children's perspec-
tives into re-envisioning work and family.
I. WOMEN
The theoretical and political appeal of McCaffery's proposal to
eliminate gender bias in the tax structure by taxing women less is that
it is in accord with widely accepted notions of formal equality, the
model which has predominated thus far in achieving increased equal-
ity for women in the gender neutral tradition of liberal jurispru-
dence. 0 Under the liberal jurisprudence model, formal equality
assures that women are treated the same as men. In its strongest
form, liberal jurisprudence reaches beyond facial differentiation to
include bias due to the disproportionate gender impact of facially neu-
tral policies. An argument for the removal of tax rules that dispropor-
tionately discourage women from wage work fits the liberal model. It
15. See id at 190.
16. See id at 193.
17. lId at 200.
18. See id at 197.
19. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 314; see also TAING WOMEN, supra note 1, at 275-83.
20. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Wendy N. Williams, Will Equality Require More Than Assimi-
lation, Accommodation, or Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERs L. REv.
825 (1985).
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eliminates a constraint on women's choices. In addition to removing a
barrier women face, McCaffery's proposal also recognizes a key sym-
bolic and real shift in our view of married couples, from the intercon-
nected, dependent, secondary earner model to an individual tax
model. To the extent women are viewed as independent rather than
dependent taxpayers, the model of independence and individual
worth also plays into individualized notions of equality and responsi-
bility that resonate within liberal jurisprudence.
In addition to its symbolic worth and congruence with liberal
principles, there is no doubt that McCaffery's reform would have a
real impact on many women. It is significant, nevertheless, that
women's work participation rates have risen in spite of tax barriers
and in spite of the high degree of ambivalence and unhappiness that
McCaffery also documents. I question, then, how great a response the
removal of this tax barrier would create. There are certainly other
areas where the logic of economics pushes strongly in one direction,
but psychological response and social conduct nevertheless goes in
another direction. Divorce is a good example. While the economics
of divorce should have resulted in a declining rate of divorce, the
divorce rate instead has remained relatively constant since the 1980s.21
The declining rate of real welfare benefits is another example; it
should (and those who favor such cuts hope it will) act as an economic
deterrent to the formation of single-parent families. Instead, the rate
of single-parent family formation continues to rise. 2
Even if McCaffery's proposed reform were to change the behav-
ior of a significant number of women to enter wage work or to do
more wage work, the economic benefits to women would be signifi-
cantly limited by ongoing limitations on women's employment oppor-
tunities. Although removal of tax disincentives may impact how
women perceive their choices, it will not change the structure of the
labor market, which is characterized by persistent differentials in
employment opportunities for women as compared to men.' Tax
reform may change the factors women weigh in deciding whether to
21. The rate of divorce per 1,000 population was 3.5 in 1970, rose to 5.2 in 1980, and then
dropped slightly to 4.7 in 1990. The rate in 1994 was 4.6. U.S. DEPT. OF COMNMRCE, STATIS-
CAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, at 104 tbl. 146 (1996)[hereinafter 1996 STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACr].
22. See DowD, supra note 2, at 4-5.
23. For a recent global view, see Good for Business: Making Full Use of the Nation's
Human Capital" Fact-Finding Report of the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, Mar. 16, 1995,
reprinted in 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at d30 (Mar. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Glass Ceil-
ing Report]. For a detailed view within one company of promotional sex and race segregation
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engage in wage work or care for children. However, tax reform will
increase neither the range of opportunities for wage work, nor the
salaries paid, nor the opportunity structure, all of which remain signif-
icantly more limited for most women, particularly women with sole or
primary caretaking responsibilities for young children.24 Removal of
the tax bias only ensures that whatever money women earn is not
taxed in a biased way-no longer adding insult to injury, but the
underlying injury remains.
Just over 75% of women ages 25-54 are in the labor force.'
According to recent statistics, women on average currently earn sev-
enty-two cents for every dollar that men earn, a median hourly wage
of $8.59, up by thirty-four cents an hour since 1979.26 Of those work-
ers earning minimum wage, 64% are women, considerably higher than
women's proportion of the workforce2 7 Not surprisingly, three-
quarters of women make less than $25,000 per year.28 The gap is
greater for mothers. Among younger women in the workforce
(median age 30), the wage gap has narrowed to ninety-five cents in
1991, but only to seventy-five cents for mothers in the same age group.
As one researcher has noted, the family status penalty intensified dur-
ing the 1980s.29 The wage gap persists at all levels: the ratio of female
to male earnings ranged in one 1992 Census Bureau study of manage-
rial workers from a low of 50% in banking to a high of 85% in human
services.3°
Women are highly sex-segregated in the workforce, both between
and within occupations. Nearly 75% of employed women work in the
and differential, see Elizabeth A. Paulin & Jennifer M. Mellor, Gender, Race and Promotions
Within a Private-Sector Firm, 35 INDus. REL 276 (1996).
24. See DowD, supra note 2, at 21; see also FRANCINE BLAU & MARIANNE FERBER, TiH
ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN AND WORK (1992); SusAN FALUDi, BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 363-99 (1991).
25. Labor Force: Women Slowly Making Gains in Workplace Report Concludes, 1997 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at A2 (Jan. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Women Slowly Making Gains].
26. See Abid Aslam, United States: Gender Wage Gap Narrows as Wages Fall, Inter Press
Service, July 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Current News File. The gender wage
gap has narrowed due to a significant fall in men's wages rather than any significant rise in
women's wages. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Department of Labor, Working Women Count Recommendations: Making Work
Better for Women Report to the President, Mar. 15, 1995, reprinted in 1995 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 69, at D25 (Apr. 11, 1995).
29. See Pam Ginsbach, Family Leave: Leave Coverage Offers Women Advantage of Job
Continuity, Higher Pay, Says Study, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at A-3 (Jan. 21, 1997).
30. See Glass Ceiling Report, supra note 23, at 37.
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services industries, including wholesale and retail trade, finance, insur-
ance and real estate. The jobs in these sectors are low-level, low-pay-
ing jobs with little mobility. To the extent women have made
significant inroads in some nontraditional fields (pharmacists, editors,
insurance adjustors, real estate agents), the wages in those fields have
leveled or declined.3' Very few women rise to senior managerial jobs,
although women constitute 43% of managers. 32 From 1985-1995, in
the Fortune 1500 companies, only three to five percent of the manag-
ers were women, and of those, virtually all of them were white.3 3 The
glass ceiling is firmly in place for most women; for women of color, it
is so solid that it is described as "brick" or "concrete. 3 4
Inequality in the market requires stronger .enforcement of
existing discrimination laws as well as affirmative restructuring.3 1 The
role of antidiscrimination laws could be significantly expanded if the
laws were vigorously used to attack sex segregation3 6 and gender ster-
eotyping, 7 as well as to enforce pay equity. But even with the most
expansive and thorough enforcement of antidiscrimination laws,
affirmative restructuring is needed. Top-down strategies are needed
in conjunction with bottom-up proposals that unleash individual
choices.
Expanding choice, or removing encumbrances from choices, is
one of the core justifications for taxing women less. But another ques-
tion McCaffery's proposed tax reform raises is whether making the
choice to do wage work less burdened results in valuing wage work to
the detriment of supporting care for children and other dependents. I
do not think this is McCaffery's aim. But removing tax disincentives
to wage work and shifting to an individual tax system nevertheless
may have that effect by further supporting wage work and'self-suffi-
ciency without supporting non-wage family work as well. Therefore,
this reform would open up one choice while doing nothing for
31. See Women Slowly Making Gains, supra note 25.
32. See id.
33. See Glass Ceiling Report, supra note 23, at 53.
34. See id. at 78.
35. See Nancy Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Dis-
crimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989).
36. See Vickie Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work. Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HAIv. L. REv. 1749 (1990).
37. The recognition of gender stereotyping should be expanded as a form of sex discrimina-
tion as in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and as developed by sexual harass-
ment jurisprudence.
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another. While the option of performing wage work is made more
attractive, there is no support for part-time work or staying at home
full-time, for some period of time or even a lengthy period of time.
McCaffery suggests that women will respond to tax reform. However,
would the effect of this removal of gender bias act as an incentive to
push women more strongly toward a male model of work and family
(or a female double shift model) rather than pushing the wage work
structure and the allocation of family responsibilities to change?
McCaffery's goal is clearly not to argue for an assimilationist, male-
defined model. Is it possible to expand choices by a range of tax
reform, or are we inevitably choosing one model over the other?
The Swedish example suggests that radical change in the distribu-
tion of work-family responsibilities is unlikely to occur as a result of
an individual taxpayer system. The Swedish example is particularly
important because the tax structure rests on principles of individual
taxation, individual responsibility and a strong commitment to gender
equality.38 In addition to this tax policy, Sweden has the most gener-
ous array of family support policies in the world, including universal
and need-based family allowances, paid parental leave, maternity
leave, health insurance, parenting sick days and nearly universal child
care.39 Furthermore, public policy has strongly favored gender neu-
trality and a model of shared gender responsibility for work and fam-
ily. Despite this structure, the degree of gender segregation in the
Swedish workforce is as high as that in the United States, and the
allocation of work and family responsibilities, while less skewed than
in the United States, remains remarkably gendered.4 °
McCaffery's reform powerfully demonstrates the bias in the sys-
tem that treats most married women differently than most married
men in order to support patriarchal family structures. The argument
for fairness and neutrality in the face of this evidence is strong. Yet
the limits of this reform are inherent in the inequalities of the existing
workplaces. Restructuring of the labor market shows little evidence
38. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49, 86-87 (1972); Nancy Dowd, Envisioning Work
and Family: A Critical Perspective on International Models, 26 HARv. J. ON LEois. 311, 322-23
(1989).
39. See Markus Jintti & Sheldon Danziger, Child Poverty in Sweden and the United States:
The Effect of Social Transfers and Parental Labor Force Participation, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 48, 50-52 (1994).
40. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2053-54 (1996); Dowd, supra note 38, at 322.
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of occurring voluntarily.41 The Swedish example suggests that even
with family support policies in place the process of achieving equality
(if by that we mean shared gender responsibilities for work and fam-
ily, on an androgynous model) is extraordinarily slow.
II. MEN
What McCaffery has to say about men intrigues me the most. He
argues that we should "tax men more, precisely on account of their
insistence on working as they always have and precisely until their
behavior, in the aggregate, becomes as variable and susceptible to
social and other pressures as women's behavior is. We will compel
men to look for choices." 42
I can almost hear the screams, the howls of protest. It might be
fine to remove the disincentives from women doing wage (male)
work, but it would be another thing entirely to tax men more heavily
for doing wage (male) work. The female side of McCaffery's proposal
sounds modest and limited. It stays in line with the tradition of formal
equality by removing unnecessary barriers connected to outmoded
stereotypes. There is also a compelling logic in favor of a tax system
that would support greater wage work, and therefore greater revenue,
as well as promote equality by ensuring that individuals not face sub-
stantially different consequences by gender for engaging in wage
work. But his proposal for men challenges the stereotypes, and rejects
the traditional male role by disadvantaging that role with the express
end of undermining patriarchy. Rather than expanding choices or
making the consequences of choices more neutral, this proposal
imposes negative outcomes connected to certain choices in an effort to
discourage particular models, and thereby reorients fundamental roles
and structures of work and family. In a sense, the reform functions in
the same way as the very structure that McCaffery wants to dismantle:
41. See Jill Smolowe, The Stalled Revolution, TimE, May 6, 1996, at 63 ("'The workplace
really hasn't changed much, and public policies haven't kept up with the social changes."') (quot-
ing Paul Roman, Director of the Public Policy Institute at Radcliffe College); see also Peter
Busowski, American Workers Face Time Crunch Reducing Job Performance and Satisfaction,
1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at D-18 (Jan. 8, 1997) (discussing how employer's reluctance
to implement change leads to a "disgruntled work force"); Work Family Conference Explores
Conflicts, Impact of Technology, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at D22 (Nov. 21, 1994)
(discussing the need for corporations to recognize how work problems create family problems).
42. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 314-15; see also TAXING WOMEN, supra note 1, at 198-201,
229-66.
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it supports a particular gender role model. Does the goal of eliminat-
ing patriarchy as opposed to legitimating patriarchy justify the differ-
ent result? Can the power of law be used to mandate (or nearly so)
normative change? And if the result is a more egalitarian distribution
of work and family responsibilities, is that equality goal sufficiently
valuable to justify such a policy?
This is a courageous, difficult position to take. Whether McCaf-
fery is right or wrong about the means, he is right about the end: men
must shift their lived responsibilities of work and family. If men are to
stop being the fathers that patriarchy has pushed them to be, they
must have models for the new fathers that they are to become.
It is a remarkable fact of the allocation of family responsibilities
that it is so strongly gendered and that we seem to accept that pattern
as a given. Historically, we explained the allocation as a conscious
division of gender roles. Child rearing was women's role; wage work
was men's role. Men's parenting role was defined as purely economic,
providing sufficient income to support unwaged household work.
Indeed, men were not even studied by the discipline of child develop-
ment until the 1970s, and studies of mothers still predominate over
those of fathers.43 To the extent men's role went beyond the eco-
nomic, they were viewed either as disciplinarians or as connections to
the public sphere. As Talcott Parsons saw it, mothers had an internal,
"expressive" role while fathers had an external, "instrumental" role
connecting the family with the world at large.44
In theory we have done away with all that, based on principles of
gender neutrality in both wage work and family responsibilities. Old
models die hard, however. We retain a strong sense of the uniqueness
of fathering as opposed to mothering, even amidst gender neutrality.
Much of the rhetoric around single parenting reflects this view: what
makes these families dysfunctional, in the eyes of many, is the absence
of male role models. This is premised on the assumption of men's
difference as parents. Yet all the data that we have about fathers fails
to support the uniqueness myth. Instead, the reality is that there are
no significant differences: men who parent to the same or similar
extent as women, nurture like mothers. The manner, form and con-
tent of their fathering replicates the care-giving model that we associ-
ate with motherhood.
43. See DowD, supra note 2, at 13.
44. See id. at 28.
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More significant than the persistence of myths of gender unique-
ness, however, is the stark difference (or distance) between the rheto-
ric of gender neutrality and the reality of gendered patterns of
nurturing. This pattern persists, and is largely accepted, within marital
families at the same .time that it is decried as inherently harmful in
single-parent families. This strong gender pattern, reinforced by the
gender bias in the tax code, generates the typical post-divorce family
where actual nurturing is mother-centered even if legal responsibility
is gender-neutrally "joint" or "equal." The highly gendered pattern of
post-divorce parenting is predictable from the more hidden, but just as
strongly gendered pattern of nurturing and caretaking work within the
marital family. In this sense, both parents in the marital family are
single parents, adopting the gendered parenting roles and differential
combinations of work and family responsibility that emerge so clearly
at divorce.
The patterns begin within marriage. The allocation of care-giving
responsibilities within marriage has not changed much.4 One won-
ders if we have only given up traditional gender roles for an implicit
thesis of self-segregation: parenting roles (and housework responsibil-
ities) are no longer dictated, but chosen. The choice of many men is
not to nurture their children in any meaningful way. Why is that so?
What is their notion of fatherhood? Why is the pattern of men's nur-
turing both within and outside of marriage so minimalistic?
The answer of some who decry father absence is to argue for rein-
vesting patriarchy with its traditional valued role. David Blanken-
horn, for example, argues that fathers are the linchpin of families, and
by extension, society.46 He not only sees fatherhood as essential to
children,47 but more importantly, that fatherhood is essential to men.
The premise is that fatherhood is essential to "civilize" the otherwise
violent, anti-familial character of men. "[F]atherhood, more than any
other male activity, helps men to become good men.... [F]atherhood
bends maleness ... toward prosocial purposes. 48 What is striking
45. See generally KATHLEEN GERSON, No MAN'S LAND: MEN'S CHANGING Commrrmmrs
TO FAMILY AND WORK 8 (1993) (discussing the slow trend toward more nurturing father
figures); Women Slowly Making Gains, supra note 25, at 2 (married mothers have reduced
housework from 30 to 20 hours since 1985; men have increased their work to nearly 10 hours
from 5 hours).
46. DAVID BLANKENHoRN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OuR MOST URGENT
SociAL PROBLEM 25 (1995).
47. Id. Blankenhorn claims "fatherhood privileges children."
48. Id.
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about this argument, beyond its lack of grounding in any proof of gen-
der uniqueness, is the negative view of men and masculinity that it
presumes. This biological, essentialist argument seems to see men's
core nature in Hobbesian terms as nasty, brutish and short, tamed
only by the constraints of marriage and family.
The real challeng6 for reconstructing fatherhood is not the assault
on patriarchy, but rather the patriarchy itself. Can we imagine father-
hood outside of a hierarchical, biological, economic role? Can we
imagine a valued nurturing role for men, whether as fathers or not?
The example of men who do parent, primarily or solely, certainly sug-
gests that it is possible. Men's capability, however, should not be con-
fused with their choices. While more men are nurturing their
children, the dominant pattern remains one of emotional disconnec-
tion to children. McCaffery's proposal suggests that men need to be
forced to be different (and presumably) better fathers. I wonder
whether this is necessarily so.
Some of the barriers are certainly economic. Fathers are unlikely
to give up wage work (or feel that they can) when income cannot be
replaced by the mother and the state provides no family support. The
same market inequities that limit the impact of tax reform for women
also generate a dynamic that separates men from nurturing. More-
over, the lack of family support policies disproportionately impacts
men, because society provides far less formal or informal support for
men to nurture.49 Men are unlikely to change in the absence of radi-
cal structural change that would support a different role.
The more serious barriers, however, may be as much cultural as
economic. It is simply astonishing that we accept the gendered pat-
tern of parenting as a given; but not so if we accept a limited role as a
norm. It is my thesis that the two most significant barriers to recon-
structing fatherhood into a nurturing role are our cultural constructs
of masculinity and the pervasiveness of violence in male culture. We
have largely defined masculinity in a way that excludes parenting.
Violence is so strongly tied to masculinity that it contradicts nurturing
except, perhaps, that the highest form of male nurturance is the
defense of one's children, or revenge for any harm done to them.
In addition, another challenge to the reconstruction of fathering
is our understanding of what we mean by equal parenting, whether
49. See Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness,
43 UCLA L. Rv. 1037, 1073-74 (1996).
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carried out within one household or not, and within a marriage or not.
We have very little sense about what equal parenting is supposed to
be. We don't have a model of how a partnership of men and women is
supposed to work. Instead, we operate with a single parent model of
parenting; a model supported, as McCaffery demonstrates, by the cur-
rent structure of the tax system. The single parent model is consistent
with a pattern of fatherhood within married couples as a role of sup-
port and backup for the primary or sole caregiver, usually the mother,
rather than as a doubling of the nurture available to children. Cer-
tainly support of caregivers is important but it is at best indirect
parenting. We seem to think equality means dual parenting, not an
equal opportunity to be a single parent (in the primary, nurturing
sense) within or outside of marriage. Reconstructing fatherhood is
therefore intertwined with the question of what equality should be. If
we continue to see children's needs as being provided on a sole care-
giver model, then our structure needs to be sensitive to the needs of
that caregiver to provide the care that our children deserve. To the
extent McCaffery's proposals would begin to undermine that, is the
implicit model one of roughly equal working and parenting? We have
not restructured the workplace to support dual parenting nor have we
thought through the dynamic of dual parenting in families. For men
this raises the challenge of constructing a non-dominating, non-violent
model for relationships. For women this invades a traditional sphere
of women's value with the potential of intensifying violence-related
dominance. Men's equality will continue to be partial until men con-
front the violent ideal in masculinity.
III. CHILDREN
Those who talk about work and family, and struggle with the dif-
ficult issues of gender equality often do so from, and for, the love of
children. Children's equality is a powerful argument for affirmative
restructuring to ensure equality in the balancing of work and family.
If children are to have a meaningful equal opportunity to develop
their full potential, their core familial environment must be supported.
That requires not only supporting their families, but also social com-
mitment and responsibility for the welfare of all children.
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Our tendency is to assume we can achieve this best by focusing on
the adults.5" By looking at how the tax structure disadvantages secon-
dary wage earners, McCaffery reminds us that there is bias in the way
we tax the wage work of married women as opposed to the wage work
of married men that reinforces the inequality. Removal of gender
bias and redistribution of workforce responsibility is presumed to be
to children's benefit. But the deeper question for children is whether
they get more and/or better parenting. Is this a zero sum game (with a
shrinking pie) where waged and unwaged work must be reallocated,
or has the game fundamentally changed? The option of a single
income family is rapidly disappearing; most families require the
income of two wage earners simply to stay in place in real income
terms.51 If more wage work is necessary, have we assumed, or simply
accepted, that work will continue to be (and even increase) at the
expense of family? Will we continue to follow the philosophy that
children are an individual responsibility and take no social responsibil-
ity for children? The losers in this scenario are children, whose
dependency needs disappear, subsumed beneath the struggle for
redistribution of family burdens between mothers and fathers.
Determining, then, whether our model should be one of single
parenting/primary caretaker, or dual parenting, with each parent com-
mitted to an expanded vision of care for children, should be evaluated
from children's perspectives. From that point of view we might find
the flexibility we desperately need, as well as the stark realities of chil-
dren's needs that we must acknowledge. The flexibility comes from
the data that indicate that children flourish in all forms of families,
single or two parent, heterosexual or homosexual, marital or non-mar-
ital, nuclear or extended. The realities include the shocking rate of
children's poverty, the sharp inequities of opportunity that creates,
50. See generally Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 11 (1994) (examining how "both constitutional and
family law jurisprudence exclude children's personhood").
51. See Aslam, supra note 26 ("It's been pretty obvious for the past 20 years that the eco-
nomic situation of women and men has been worsening. Family incomes have been maintained
only in families where two spouses have been put to work."). Real wages have been in decline
since the 1970s. In constant dollars, the average weekly wage of production and nonsupervisory
workers fell 16.1% from 1973 to 1993. By 1994, the average full-time production employee had
after-tax income of $16,833.00, barely above the poverty line. See Peter M. Cicchino, The Prob-
lem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the United States, 5
J.L. & PoL'y 5, 67-68 (1996). Nearly one in five full-time workers is categorized as a low-income
worker, a 50% increase since 1979. See U.S. Census Bureau, Press Release, One in Five Full-
Tme Workers Earns Low Wages, Census Bureau Says (Mar. 31, 1994) (unpublished press
release, on file with the Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies).
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and the diminishing support for the unwaged care essential to chil-
dren's success.
The most horrifying statistic about children is that one in five
lives in poverty, and that number has moved steadily toward one in
four. 2 The rate of child poverty has been increasing since the mid-70s
and continues to rise; currently, children are poor at double the rate of
the general population. The degree of children's poverty is worsening,
with the highest rates experienced by the youngest children under age
five. The scope, intensity and duration are strongly correlated to
race.53 Poverty dooms equality for children. Poverty produces well-
known correlations to low opportunity, especially with respect to
housing and education, that condemns poor children to second class
citizenship. In addition, the harmful effects include poor physical and
psychological health, and high criminal victimization and crime
commission.54
In our focus on adults' equality, we have lost sight not only of
children's economic needs but also of their other dependency needs,
for psychological, social and cultural care. I worry about our inability
to deal with dependency, to acknowledge children's needs, or to care
for their care givers. As Professor Martha Fineman and Professor
Anne Estin have eloquently pointed out, our failure to conceptualize
the place of this essential care and those who provide it, and by exten-
sion to provide our social and legal support for dependency without
recreating patriarchal prisons, is a serious flaw in the family-law and
employment-law equality norms.55
The plus for children under McCaffery's proposal is that low
income families would particularly benefit from a shift away from a
gender biased structure. The tax incentive for these families currently
disrupts family structure in order to increase family resources. On the
other hand, the reform is tied to increasing wage work that is likely to
be ill-paid and inadequate. Without an increase in the available
52. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABsTrACT, supra note 21, at 473 tbl. 733. Some estimates
already put the figure at 26% using the federal poverty line as the relevant measure. See also
Cicchino, supra note 51, at 10. If poverty is measured by income 150% of the poverty line
($21,981 for a family of 4 in 1993), 34% of all children were poor; if measured at 175% ($25,644
for a family of 4 in 1993), 39.8% of children were poor. See id.
53. See Cicchino, supra note 51, at 24.
54. See id. at 25.
55. MARTHA ALBERSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Anne Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the
Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. Rav. 721, 721 (1993).
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resources to match children's needs, this reform will have limited
impact. An increase in resources could come from affirmative family
support policies as well as strategies to increase wage work income
(e.g., guaranteed family income or microcredit strategies). Just as
important as expanding the economic strategies for equality, however,
is the development of a guarantee or vision of children's nurture.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is not easy to think about equality. Equality issues can be
thought of in several ways: uncovering and understanding the inequal-
ities of our current context; defining an ideal or goal toward which
policy should aim; or devising strategies to get from one to the other,
considering short-term and long-term approaches, inevitable and
unintended consequences. Looking at McCaffery's proposal from the
perspectives of women's, men's and children's equality complicates
the analysis further by considering the separate interests of inherently
connected groups. Yet it also gives us a clearer sense of the benefits
of this proposal and its place amidst other needed reforms. McCaffery
proposes reform as a means to achieve more meaningful, nuanced,
flexible, creative notions of equality. It is time to stop taxing women
on their choices; it is time to open men to theirs. With that freedom,
perhaps we can more clearly move toward equality.
AFTERWORD

